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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 31/07/2006

Accident number: 428

Accident time: 10:35

Accident Date: 01/08/2002

Where it occurred: M4176 MF, Phum O
Lvie, Khum Boeung
Being, Malai District,
BMC, BANTEAY
MEANCHAY

Country: Cambodia

Primary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment (?)

Class: Vegetation removal
accident

Date of main report: 08/08/2002

ID original source: AS

Name of source: [Name removed]

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: soft

Date record created: 31/07/2006

Date last modified: 31/07/2006

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR 135965

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
The internal accident report was made available during 2005. It is reproduced below, edited
for anonymity.
INVESTIGATION REPORT
INTO MINE ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON 01 AUGUST 2002 AT M4176 MINEFIELD,
BANTEAY MEANCHAY.

REPORT PREPARED BY: DEPUTY DIRECTOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
CONTENTS

1.

Order for assembly of Investigation.

2.

Report by the Investigation Team.

3.

Statements By:

5.

a.

First Witness, Section Commander DU1

b.

Second Witness, deminer DU1

c.

Third Witness, [The Victim], [Demining group] deminer DU1

Report and attachments by [Demining group] Manager

ORDER FOR ASSEMBLY OF FORMAL INVESTIGATION
Orders by: Deputy Director General, [Demining Group]

A formal investigation is to be conducted as soon as possible for the purpose of collecting and
recording evidence into the Mine Accident that occurred on 01 August 2002 in the M4176
Minefield, BMC, in which one deminer was injured.
The investigation team is to prepare a report and provide comment based on its findings. The
Team leader is to present the findings of the investigation to the [Demining group] executive
council within five days of the conduct of the investigation.
Team Leader, Deputy Director Planning and Operations
The team leader may summons any witnesses to attend who are employees of [Demining
group].

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Background
1.

What is the history of the minefield?

2.

When, where and at what time did the accident occur?

3.

Who were the persons involved?

4.

What were the circumstances leading up to the accident?

5.

Describe the nature of the accident in detail.

6.

When did clearance operations commence in the minefield?

7.

Have clearance operations concluded?

8.

Has the minefield been formally handed over to the appropriate authority?
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Analysis
1.

Did the accident occur in the [Demining group] minefield?

2.

What caused the injuries?

3.

What was the nature and extent of the injuries to the casualties?

4.
What action was taken immediately after the accident was reported to [Demining
group]?
5.

What measures could have taken place to prevent the accident?

6.

Were any [Demining group] SOP or written orders breached?

7.

Is there any weakness in our current method of the control and monitor?

8.
Were there any problems specific to this minefield or area that made demining
difficult?
9.
Are there any problems with our current mine detectors and their ability to detect
mines or UXO buried up to 10 centimetres deep?

Post Accident
1.

Were all accident notifications completed according to internal order/SOP?

2.

How can we prevent this from happening again in the future?

3.

What if anything has been done to assist the accident victims?

4.

Has the Minefield been re checked?

5.
What actions has the DU taken to try and prevent a re occurrence of the same
nature?

Signed at: Phnom Penh, 01 August 2002, Deputy Director General Demining Group

FORMAL INVESTIGATION
SUMMARY FINDINGS
General
1.
The formal investigation into the accident was conducted over the period 01 – 02
August 2002. In addition to visiting the accident scene, two witnesses were interviewed and
their evidence recorded. The following is a record of the investigation as well as the summary
findings and recommendations.
Terms of Reference
2.
The following answers are provided to questions directed by the Deputy Director
General.
a.

Background

Q) What is the history of the minefield?
A) The minefield was laid in the 1980s by the Khmer Rouge, VN, and Government Forces for
defending along Khmer-Thai border. It was a hot base line battlefield in the former KR
stronghold. Demining operations commenced on 08 July 2002 and still continue. About 96 AP
Mines and at least 14 UXO have been found so far. Most types of mines found include the
PMN. Patterns suggest that the mines were laid defensively. The purpose of clearing this
area is for agriculture. Before [Demining group] arrived, a bulldozer had been used to clear up
the field. It left piles of soil along the sides of the field with mines located within them.
Q) When, where and at what time did the accident occur?
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A) The accident happened at approximately 10:35 hrs on 01 August 2002 at GR 135965, in
Minefield M4176 at Phum O Lvie, Khum Boeung Being, Malai District, BMC.

The picture shows the accident site with the Victim’s sunhat beside the crater.
Q) Who were the persons involved?
A) Mobile Platoon 103 of DU1 and three persons were directly involved. Mr. [The Victim] Mr
[Deminer 1], Mr. [Section Commander] mobile platoon 103.
Q) What were the circumstances leading up to the accident?
A) During conducting Vegetation Removal Drills at minefield M4176, to pull a branch of
deadwood which its end buried in a mound of excavated soil from the uncleared area at the
head of lane and it was activated and detonated to a buried mine underneath.
Q) Describe the nature of the accident in detail.
A) Referring to demining sequence, deminer no. 1 conducted vegetation removal drill
(skipped tripwire drill due to none of tripwire); upon completion of the vegetation removal drill,
deminer no. 2 [ the victim] conducted detector drill. These drills had been repeated two to
three times already to the time of accident occurred. Mr. [name excised], the victim's peer,
told that he found deminer no. 1 removed the cut salvages once then the second time and
then he heard an explosion and found [the victim] falling backward into the cleared area. Then
he called section commander for help, section commander called to mobile platoon
commander and platoon commander called medic but he was absent then Mobile Platoon
Commander 101 who treated and stabilized the victim before evacuating him to Battambang
Emergency Hospital. The victim was evacuated at around 11:00 hrs from M4176 and arrived
Battambang Emergency Hospital around 14:20 hrs.
Q) When did clearance operations commence in the minefield?
A) Clearance operations commenced on 08 July 2002.
Q) Have clearance operations concluded?
A) No. The area of the accident was in a process of being cleared.
Q) Has the minefield been handed over to the appropriate authority?
A) No, it has not been fully cleared as yet.
b.

Analysis

Q) Did the accident occur in [Demining group] Minefield?
A) Yes. The accident occurred in a perimeter MF boundary.
Q) What caused the injuries?
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A) Based on the physical evidence, a Type PMN Anti Personnel Mine.
Q) What was the nature and extent of injuries to casualties?
A) Only one person, the victim, was injured. He suffered a blast injury to the face and gravely
hurt to left eye, which might be lost sight or blind.
Q) What action was taken immediately after the accident was reported to [Demining group]?
A) After being informed shortly after the accident, Mobile Platoon Commander
dispatched an ambulance and medic to treat, stabilize the victim and then transported to the
Emergency Hospital in Battambang. The DU Manager later inspected the accident scene and
conducted a preliminary scene examination to establish the facts.
Q) What measures could have taken place to prevent the accident?
A) It shall be adhered strictly to SOP and conduct demining drill accordingly.
Q) Were any [Demining group] SOP or written orders breached?
A) Yes.
Q) Are there any problems with our current Mine detectors and their ability to detect Mines or
UXO buried up to 10 cm deep?
A) No. The Platoon Commander who cleared the area in the vicinity of the accident was
confident in the mine detectors ability to locate all types of mines up to a depth of 10 cm. In
saying this though, there is a lot of discussion on the age, battery usage and workloads
placed on the detectors. But for this case it happened at the vegetation removal drill.
Q) Were there any problems specific to this minefield or area that made demining difficult?
A) Yes. A bulldozer was used to clear a field exploding mines as it progressed as well as
making a range of mounds at the end of the field which buried deadwood and an unknown
quantity of mines. [Demining group] deminers wherever possible, level by level, cleared and
continue to clear as many of these mounds as possible. There were mounds of earth at the
accident site.
Q) Is there any weakness in our current method of quality control?
A) In this accident, this question is not applicable. The accident caused by the negligence or
not adhered to SOP, he thought that that rotten branch of deadwood could be pulled without
disturbing to any buried mines, then he pulled it of which end buried in a mound, where there
have been incorrectly placed mines.
c.

Post Accident

Q) Were all accident notifications completed according to internal orders/SOP?
A) In the process.
Q) How can we prevent this from happening again in the future?
A) All deminers, Section Commanders are to be refresher training on demining drills, basically
on vegetation removal drill, Mine detector drill and Prodder and Excavation drill.
Q) What if anything has been done to assist the accident victims?
A) Not as yet. It shall be decided by Compensation Committee adhered to [Demining group]
Policy.
Q) Has the area been re checked or cleared?
A) No. The area is yet to be cleared. It is hoped that BC will be deployed to complete the
clearance of these mound areas.
Q) What action has the DU taken to prevent a re-occurrence of the same nature?
A) Reinforcing strictly control and directly coach on the safety manner of demining operations
in the hazardous area.
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Conclusion
3.
The accident occurred in a [Demining group] Minefield, M4176 caused by pulling a
branch of deadwood from the head of clearance lane, of which it activated and detonated to a
buried mine underneath the mound of soil. It is breached SOP, adherence to [Demining
group] SOP – Vegetation Removal drill,...[ "All vegetation must be cut from the top down and
cut into manageable sizes so that pieces not fall into the uncleared area..." ... "Vegetation is
not to be pulled or forced from uncleared area"...] etc.
4.
Based on physical evidence, it is a buried mine Type PMN underneath the mound of
excavated earth awaiting any disturbing movement or pressure then detonated.
5.
The accident is caused of breaching SOP. The accident is not an applicable of
[Demining group] SOP or internal order but the negligence or forgettable mind of the deminer
himself.

Recommendations
6.
The investigation team after consideration of all factors makes the following
recommendations:
a.
Strictly reinforce control and monitor by section commander and platoon commander
on demining operations performance drills and coaching basic instruction specifically upon its
nature.
b.
All deminers and Section Commanders are to be refreshed training on demining
operations drill.
c.

Mobile Platoon Commanders shall be trained on 1st line and middle management.

d.
Information from this and other accident/incident investigations should be forwarded
to the appropriate CMAC departments for perusal and discussion.

Signed at: Battambang 08 August 2002, Investigation Team Leader
[The ground shown in the photographs is soft and friable with buried, rotting wood – buried
by the bulldozer.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 571

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 3 Hours, 45 minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Eye
severe Face
severe Head
COMMENT
See Medical report.
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Medical Report
No formal medical report was made available.
A photograph showed head, left eye and facial injury.

Analysis
The primary case of this accident is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems that the
victim was operating in breach of SOPs at the time and carelessly initiated a mine while trying
to pull a cut branch from a pile of bulldozed earth. The secondary cause is listed as
“Inadequate equipment” because the victim had to work through a bulldozed berm by hand. It
seems that the group did not oblige deminers to wear PPE during vegetation removal.
The incident "Notes" mention an inadequate medical provision. This refers to the fact that it
took close to four hours for a victim to reach a hospital.
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